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Vedanta Paribhasha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra
A Summary
By S. N. Sastri

The Vedanta-Paribhasha is an epistemological workon Advaita Vedanta as interpreted by the Vivarana school of PrakasatmaYati, the commentator on Padmapada's Panchapadika. The author isbelieved to have lived in the seventeenth century in South India. Inthis work he has adopted the method and phraseology of Navya-Nyaya,introduced by Gangesa Upadhyaya in the fourteenth century.

(Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature and validity of knowledge).

The work begins with the following prayer:

Ibow to that Supreme Self, the embodiment of Existence, Knowledge andBliss, by the manifestation of the nescience associated with which theprojection of the elements and all things made up of the elements takesplace.

The first six chapters are devoted to establishing themeans of valid knowledge (pramanas) from the standpoint of Vedanta,refuting the other systems of philosophy, particularly Nyaya-Vaiseshika.

The pramanas according to the various systems

Charvakas - Only perception (Pratyaksha).

Buddhists and Vaiseshikas - Perception and Inference

(Pratyaksha and Anumana)

Sankhya and Yoga - Perception, Inference and Verbal testimony (Pratyaksha, Anumana and Sabda).

Nyaya - Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony and Comparison (Pratyaksha, Anumana, Sabda and Upamana).

PrabhakaraMimamsa - Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony, Comparison andPresumption (Pratyaksha, Anumana, Sabda, Upamana and Arthapatti).

Vedantaand Bhatta Mimamsa - Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony,Comparison, Presumption and Non-apprehension (Pratyaksha, Anumana,Sabda, Upamana, Arthapatti and Anupalabdhi).

The Naiyayikasinclude presumption under inference, but this is rejected by Vedanta onthe ground that presumption is based on negative invariableconcomitance (vyatireka-vyapti) which Vedanta does not admit, sinceVedanta admits only affirmative inference.

Valid knowledge and its means

Validknowledge (prama) is defined as that knowledge which has for its objectsomething that is not already known and is uncontradicted(anadhigata-abaadhita-arthavishayaka-jnaanam). The qualification'something that is not already known' is meant to exclude recollection.The word 'uncontradicted' excludes illusion or error, as when a rope ismistaken for a snake.

The Mimamsakas hold that time is alsocognised through the organs of sense. Thus, when an object is seen, thecognition is connected with the moment when it is seen. As a result,when an object is seen continuously for several moments, the cognitionat each moment is considered to be different from the cognition of thesame object at the previous or next moment. In this view, the cognitionat each moment is a new cognition and so the qualification 'somethingthat is not already known' applies and the definition is applicable.According to Vedanta, however, a continuous cognition for severalmoments is one single cognition. The knowledge of a pot, for example,is Consciousness reflected in the mental modification (vritti) in theform of the pot and this is just one throughout the time the same potcontinues to be seen. In this view also the definition applies.

Objection:According to Advaita Vedanta, all objects such as pot are unreal, being'mithya', and so the knowledge of the pot is contradicted and it cannotbe valid knowledge.

Answer: It is only after the realisation ofBrahman that the pot is contradicted. In the above definition,'uncontradicted' means 'not contradicted during the transmigratorystate'.

Perception as a means of knowledge

Valid perceptual knowledge is nothing but Pure Consciousness.

Objection:Consciousness is without a beginning; i.e. it is eternal. So why shouldit need the eye, etc as an instrument to produce it?

Answer:Although Consciousness is eternal, the vritti that reveals it arisesonly through the contact of the organ with the object. It isConsciousness reflected in the vritti that is spoken of as having abeginning. The vritti is figuratively designated as knowledge (thoughit is by itself insentient).

The mind is a substance with abeginning and so it has parts. The knowledge which is a mentalmodification (vritti) is an attribute of the mind, just as desire, etcare. See Br.up. 1.5.3-- "Desire, resolve, --- all these are but themind".

Though desire, etc are attributes of the mind, they arewrongly thought to be attributes of the self, in the same way as it issaid that a hot iron rod 'burns' when it is really the fire that burns.The false identification of the self with the mind is the reason forconsidering desire, happiness, etc as attributes of the self.

Accordingto the author of Vedanta Paribhasha the mind is not an organ. (However,in the Bhashya on Brahmasutra, 2.4.17, Sri Sankara says:-- In theSmriti the organs are counted as eleven, and hence the mind also isaccepted to be an organ like those of hearing, etc. The Smriti referredto here is Bhagavad gita, 13.5, second line. In the Bhashya on this itis said, "The five organs, ear etc., which are called the sense organsand the five organs which accomplish actions, and the mind, theeleventh". According to Vivarana, the mind is not an indriya, butaccording to Bhamati it is an indriya).

Objection: If the mind isnot considered as an indriya, the perception of happiness, etc, whichis produced by the mind, and not by any of the other sense-organ suchas the eye, cannot be considered to be immediate (sakshat), becauseonly perceptions produced by an indriya can be accepted as immediate.

Answer:No, because the immediacy of knowledge does not depend on its beingproduced by an indriya. If it is contended that only knowledge producedby an indriya is immediate, it would mean that God's knowledge, whichis not produced by any indriya, is not immediate, and God would neverhave any perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, if all knowledgeproduced by an indriya is considered as immediate, and the mind isconsidered as an indriya, then inference, which is produced by themind, would also have to be accepted as immediate, which is notacceptable to any one.

What is perceptual knowledge?

Perceptualknowledge (pratyaksha jnanam) arises when the Consciousness limited bythe mental mode (pramana chaitanyam) coincides with the Consciousnesslimited by the object. In perception the Consciousness becomesthreefold-- (1) Consciousness limited by the object(prameya-chaitanyam), (2) Consciousness limited by the mental mode(vritti) (pramana-chaitanyam) and (3) Consciousness limited by the mind(pramatr-chaitanyam).

The process of visual perception, accordingto Advaita Vedanta , is described in chapter 1 of Vedanta Paribhashathus. Just as the water in a tank, issuing through a hole, enters,through a channel, a number of fields and assumes the shapes of thosefields, so also the luminous mind, stretching out through the eye, goesto the space occupied by objects and becomes modified into the forms ofthose objects. Such a modification is called a vritti of the mind. Thesame fact is also stated in Panchadasi, 4.27, 28 and 29, based on SriSankara's Upadesasahasri, Metrical portion, chapter 14, verses 3 &4. The whole process of visual perception consists of the followingsteps:--

(1) The mind stretches out through the eye, reaches theobject and takes the form of the object. This is called a vrtti or modeof the mind.

(2) The mental mode removes the veil of ignorance that hides the object.

(3) Consciousness underlying the object, being manifest through the mental mode, illumines the object.

(4) The mental mode associates the object-consciousness with the subject-consciousness.

(5) The subject perceives the object.

Consciousnessmanifest through the mental mode coincident with the object serves asthe knowledge of the object. This is known as phala (fruit), being theresultant knowledge.

The mind has three main divisions in this process, namely,

(1) the part within the body,

(2) the part that extends from the body to the object perceived,

(3) the part that coincides with the object.

Thefirst part above is known as pramaataa and the consciousness manifestin it is called pramaata-chaitanya. This is the perceiver. Theconsciousness manifest in the second part is called pramaana-chaitanya,or the means of knowledge. The consciousness manifest in the third partis pramiti-chaitanya or percept.

The object perceived is calledprameya. Since the third part of the mind mentioned above coincideswith the object, prameya-chaitanya, the consciousness underlying theobject and pramiti-chaitanya become identical. The point to be kept inmind here is that all objects in this world are superimposed onConsciousness, i.e. Brahman. All objects are covered by a veil ofignorance, which has to be removed for seeing the object. It is onlyconsciousness that reveals the objects, since the objects themselvesare non-luminous.

The object perceived is but the underlyingconsciousness manifest or appearing as such. It has no existence apartfrom the all-pervading Consciousness. That all-pervading Consciousness(Brahma-chaitanya) which underlies the object known, that is to say, tobe known, becomes manifest as the object known".

(This matter is dealt with in great detail in Panchadasi, chapter VIII- Kutastha dipa.)

Inthe case of feelings such as happiness, since the Consciousness limitedby happiness, etc., coincides with the Consciousness limited by thevritti in the form of happiness, the knowledge in the form "I am happy'is also a perception (pratyakshajnanam).

Objection: In that case, recollection of past happiness would also have to be considered as pratyaksha.

Answer:No; the two limiting adjuncts, the vritti in the form of recollectionand the vritti in the form of past happiness, belong to different timesand so they cannot coincide. The criterion is that the two limitingadjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time.

Thoughpunya and papa are also attributes of the mind, they are, by nature,incapable of being perceived. Capability of being perceived is anothercriterion.

The knowledge in the form 'the hill has fire' ispratyaksha in respect of the hill and anumana in respect of fire.Knowledge such as 'this is a fragrant piece of sandal' is aparoksham(immediate) in respect of the sandal, but paroksham (mediate) inrespect of the fragrance. According to Nyaya, such a knowledge iscalled jnanalakshana pratyaksha (See Bhasha-Pariccheda- sl. 65).

(Nyayarecognises ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika) perception.Ordinary or laukika perception is of two kinds- (1) internal (maanasa),where the mind comes into contact with psychical states and processeslike cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion,etc; and (2) external perception in which the five external organs ofsense come into contact with external objects.

Extra-ordinary oralaukika perception is of three kinds-- samanyalakshana, jnanalakshanaand yogaja. The first is the perception of the universals. Whenever weperceive a particular cow we first perceive the ‘universal cowness'inhering in it.

Jnanalakshana is the ‘complicated perceptionthrough association'. For example, I see a blooming rose at a distanceand say, "I see a fragrant rose". Here the visual perception of therose revives in memory, by association, the idea of fragrance, whichwas perceived in the past through the nose. It is perception revived inmemory through the cognition (jnana) of the object in the past. Otherexamples are-‘the piece of sandalwood looks fragrant', ‘ice lookscold', etc. The theory of anyathakhyati is based on this kind ofperception. Anyatha means ‘otherwise' and ‘elsewhere'. The shell andthe silver are both separately real; only their synthesis is unreal.The shell is directly present as ‘this' while the silver existselsewhere and is revived in memory through jnanalakshana perception.

Yogaja is the perception of all objects, past, present, etc, through yogic power.)

Ageneric attribute (jati) is a distinct category according to Nyaya andis defined as "that which is eternal and inherent in many things", forexample, jarhood (ghatatva). Vedanta does not accept such genericattributes. According to Vedanta, jarhood is the sum total of thecharacteristics of a jar, which distinguishes it from other things. Itis not eternal. These characteristics are just attributes.

Accordingto Nyaya, inherence (samavaya) is eternal relation. It is the relationbetween the whole and parts, jati and vyakti, qualities or actions andthe substances possessing them, and ultimate difference (visesha) andthe eternal substances-- atoms, ether, time, space, etc. Vedanta deniesinherence and substitutes tadatmya, or difference-cum- identity,

Knowledgethat is limited by mental modifications in the form of particularobjects is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is notdifferent from the Consciousness limited by objects that are presentand are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.

This is a comprehensive statement about the criterion of perceptuality of knowledge.

The perceptuality of objects

Theperceptuality of objects such as a jar (which are superimposed on theConsciousness limited by them), consists in their not being differentfrom the Consciousness associated with the subject(pramaata-chaitanyam).

But in the case of inference, etc, sincethe mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire, etc, theConsciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousnessassociated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire,etc, is distinct from that of the subject. So the definition ofperception does not wrongly extend to such cases.

In the case ofan inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, though theConsciousness limited by them is not distinct from the Consciousnessassociated with the subject, they cannot become pratyaksha because theyare not capable of being perceived.

Being cognised by the witnessalone (kevalasakshi-vedyatvam) does not mean that they are objects ofthe witness without the presence of the mental modificationscorresponding to them, but that they are objects of the witness withoutthe activity of pramanas such as the sense-organs and inference. HencePrakasatmayati has, in Vivarana, admitted a mental modification in theform of the ego-- ahamakara-vritti. So also, in the case of an illusorypiece of silver, a vritti of nescience in the form of silver(rajata-akara-avidya-vritti) has been admitted in works such asSamkshepa-sariraka. The illusory silver is 'sakshi-bhasyam', cognisedby the witness-self, since the mental modification is not of thevyavaharika mind, but is a vritti of avidya. (See page 22 of commentaryby Abhyankar on Siddhantabindu). Thus, an object is said to be cognisedby perception when it is capable of being perceived and is devoid ofany existence apart from that of the Consciousness associated with thesubject, which Consciousness has for its limiting adjunct a mentalmodification in the form of that object.

Samyoga - conjunction - when a sense-organ is in contact with a substance such as a pot. This is called samyoga in Nyaya also.

Samyukta-tadatmya- contact of organ with qualities and other attributes of substances,such as the colour of a pot. Here the organ is connected with the potand the colour, according to Vedanta, is identical with the pot. Thisis called samyukta-samavaya in Nyaya.

Sound is a quality of ether and is therefore identical with it.

Sabdatva is identical with sound, which is identical with ether.

In Nyaya the conjunction of organs with objects which causes perception is of six kinds:--

Samyoga - contact of a pot by the eye.

Samyukta-samavaya - in the perception of colour of the pot.

Samyukta-samaveta-samavaya- the perception of the universal genus such as rupatva, colourness. InVedanta this is called samyukta-abhinna-tadatmya.

Samavaya - thehearing of sound by the organ of hearing, which is the ether in thecavity of the ear. Sound is a quality of ether and quality and thequalified are connected by samavaya.

Samaveta-samavaya - the contact in cognising soundness.

Viseshana-viseshya-bhava-sannikarsha- the conjunction in the perception of negation, as in the cognition:ghata-abhavavad-bhutalam.

Vedanta denies the relation ofviseshya-viseshana-bhava admitted by Nyaya, as in the sentence "Theground has no jar". For tadatmya Nyaya substitutes samavaya orinherence.

In Nyaya also, sound is a quality of ether. Sincequalities inhere in substances, they cannot be perceived apart from thelatter, except in the case of sound, which, though a quality, isperceived by itself.

According to Bhatta Mimamsa, however, sound is a substance.

Savikalpaka-pratyaksham- determinate perception, is that knowledge which apprehendsrelatedness (of the substantive and the qualifying attribute)(vaisishtya), such as, "I know the jar". (Here there is the relation ofsubject and object). In Nyaya determinate perception is cognition whichinvolves an attribute or an adjunct, such as "This is a Brahmana',"This is black", "This is a cook". See page 163 of A Primer of IndianLogic by Prof.S.Kuppuswami Sastri).

Nirvikalpaka-pratyaksha -indeterminate perception, is that knowledge that does not apprehendthis relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from sentences like,"This is that Devadatta" or "Thou art That". In these cases theknowledge arises by ignoring the particular features of 'This' and'Devadatta' or 'Thou' and 'That'. In Nyaya indeterminate perception isa cognition which does not involve any attribute or adjunct (prakara).

Thecriterion of perception is not the fact of its being due to an organ.The criterion is the fact of the Consciousness associated with themeans of knowledge not being different from the Consciousnessassociated with the object, when the object is present and is capableof being perceived, i.e., the identity of pramana-chaitanya andprameya-chaitanya.

Hence the knowledge arising from the sentence"Thou art That" is pratyaksha, because the subject itself being theobject, the condition about the identity of the Consciousness limitedby That and that limited by Thou is satisfied.

There is adifference between perceptuality of cognition and perceptuality ofobjects. In the inference, 'The hill has fire, because it has smoke',both the hill and the smoke are objects of perception, but not thefire, which is inferred. Hence, if the perception is considered onlywith regard to the objects, then the knowledge of the fire would not bea perception. But if perceptuality is considered in respect of thecognition, the cognition of fire is a case of perception, since allknowledge is perceptual in respect of itself in Vedanta.

Dream Perception

Consciousness,which is self-effulgent, is the sub-stratum of the chariot, etc, seenin dream. They are experienced as existent; hence it is Consciousnessmanifesting itself as Existence that is the substratum.

Some holdthat the chariot, etc, seen in dream are direct transformations ofMaya; others that they are its transformations through the medium ofthe mind.

Twofold destruction of effects

The destruction ofan effect is of two kinds. In one the destruction is together with thatof the material cause, and in the other the material cause remainsintact. The first is nullification or badha and the second is cessationor nivrtti. The cause of the first is the realisation of the truth ofthe substratum, Brahman for, without that, nescience, which is thematerial cause, is not removed. The cause of the second is the rise ofa contrary mental modification, or the removal of defects. Hence,although on waking up the world conjured up in dream may not benullified, i.e., destroyed with its material cause, nescience, in theabsence of realisation of Brahman, yet, like the cessation of a pot bythe blow of a club, the cessation of the chariot seen in dream occursas a result of a contrary cognition, or through the removal of thedefect of sleep.

Thus, according to the view that the silver seenin a nacre is an effect of the subsidiary nescience abiding in theConsciousness limited by the nacre, there is nullification of thesilver together with the nescience regarding the nacre by the knowledgethat the apparent silver is only nacre. But according to the view thatthe silver is an effect of the primal nescience, since the latter isdestroyed only by the realisation of Brahman, there is just a cessationof the silver through the knowledge that it is a nacre-- as in the caseof the destruction of a pot through the blow of a club.

Perception through or without an organ

Theperception of happiness, etc, is not due to an organ, since the mind isnot considered as an organ. The nose, tongue and skin generatecognitions of smell, taste and touch, just remaining at their seats,while the eye and ear apprehend their objects by themselves reachingthe spot occupied by the objects.

From Methods of Knowledge - p.112:

Accordingto Nyaya, the cognition 'This is a jar is manifested by a subsequentreflective knowledge (anuvyavasaya) in the form of 'I have theknowledge of the jar'. But according to Bhatta Mimamsa, the knowledgeof the jar is known by inference. When the jar is known it acquires thequality of 'knownness' (jnaatataa), which is observable. By perceivingthis mark of 'knownness' in the jar one infers one's antecedentknowledge of the jar. Thus, while the jar is known directly, itsknowledge is known indirectly, by inference. Both Bhatta and Nyaya holdthe theory known as paratah-prakasa-vada, according to which themanifestation of a particular knowledge does not rest on itself, but onanother knowledge.

Vedanta rejects both the above views. Ifknowledge is not self-manifest, if one knowledge depends on another forits manifestation, then the second would depend on a third, and so on,ad infinitum.

From Gangesa's Theory of Truth-- by Jitendranath Mohanty p. 3:

he theory of svatah- pramanya:

Advaita, and the Bhatta, Prabhakara and Misra Mimamsa.

Paratah-pramanya:

Bauddhas and Nyaya.

Svatah-prakasa

Advaita, Prabhakara Mimamsa and Bauddhas.

Paratah-prakasa

Misra and Bhatta Mimamsa and Nyaya.

Prakasais concerned with the apprehension of the knowledge itself. It asks thequestion, how is the knowledge itself known? How do I know that I know?

Pramanya is about how a knowledge becomes true and how is its truth ascertained.

Inference

Inferenceor anumaana is defined as that cognition which presupposes some othercognition. It is knowledge which arises (anu) after another knowledge.It is mediate and indirect and arises through a mark, linga or hetu(middle term) which is invariably connected with the saadhya (the majorterm). Invariable concomitance (vyaapti) is the nerve of inference. Thepresence of the linga in the paksha (minor term) is calledpakshadharmataa. The invariable association of the linga with thesaadhya is called vyaapti.

According to Nyaya, anumaana(inference) is the efficient instrument (karana) of inferentialknowledge (anumiti). Anumiti is knowledge that arises from paraamarsa.Paraamarsa is a complex cognition which arises from a combination ofthe knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyaaptijnaana) and that ofthe presence of the linga in the paksha -- technically known aspakshadharmataajnaana.

From 'A Primer of Indian Logic', page 194:

Paraamarsais an indispensable antecedent and should, therefore, be treated as thecause of anumiti. It is contended by the Naiyayikas that, in theabsence of such a paraamarsa, anumiti does not arise. Paraamarsa isalso known as lingaparaamarsa or tritiyalingaparaamarsa (the thirdcognition of the reason). The cognition of the presence of the linga inthe paksha may be said to be the first lingaparaamarsa; the cognitionof the invariable concomitance is the second. The complex cognitionwhich arises from these two cognitions is the third.

TheMimamsakas and the Advaitins hold that the complex cognition calledparaamarsa is not indispensable for anumiti, though it may actuallyarise just before anumiti in many cases. They therefore maintain thatit would be necessary to treat anumiti as the effect of vyaaptijnaanaand pakshadharmataajnana and to exclude paraamarsa from the causalcomplement of anumiti.

From Methods of Knowledge, page 146:

Accordingto Advaita, the instrument of inferential knowledge is the knowledge ofinvariable concomitance, the latent impression of which knowledge isthe cause. As soon as a person who has gained from previous experiencethe knowledge of the invariable concomitance between smoke and firesees smoke on a hill, the latent impression of this knowledge isrevived within him and immediately follows the conclusion, 'The hillhas fire'. Hence the interposition of the third consideration of themark is redundant.

Major term - saadhya - fire - probandum

Minor term - paksha - hill

Middle term - linga or hetu - smoke - probans

Anupaadhi in Nyaaya is an adventitious factor which is invariablyconcomitant with the probandum and not so with the probans. Therelation of vyaapti embodied in the proposition--- "Wherever there isfire, there is smoke"-- is not a necessary and unconditioned relationand depends upon the association of fire with the adventitious contactof wet fuel with fire. Such an adventitious circumstance is calledupaadhi. It is called upaadhi because its invariable concomitance withthe probandum (fire) comes to be erroneously associated with theprobans (smoke), just in the same way as the redness of a flower iserroneously associated with a crystal in its vicinity.

In astatement of vyaapti, the vyaapya (pervaded - smoke) should be firstreferred to and the vyaapaka (pervader - fire) should be the principalpredicate.

Nyaya postulates five component parts in the syllogism:

Pratijnaa - The proposition

Hetu - reason

Udaaharana - example

Upanaya - application

Nigamana - conclusion.

According to Advaita Vedanta only the first three steps or the last three are necessary.

The Naiyayikas classify inference into three different types, as below:

Anvaya-vyatireki- in which the invariable concomitance can be either affirmative ornegative, e.g. - 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in akitchen', and, 'Where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in alake'.

Kevala-vyatireki - that which is based solely on negativeinvariable concomitance, e.g. - 'Whoever is not omniscient is not thecreator'. The inference, 'God is omniscient, because He is the Creator'is based on this negative invariable concomitance. No knowledge ofaffirmative invariable concomitance is possible in this case, becausethe co-presence of Omniscience and Creatorship cannot be seen anywhere.

Kevala-anvayi- This is where the sadhya is present everywhere, e.g. - 'The jar isnameable, because it is knowable', because nameability (the thinginferred), is present everywhere. This inference is based solely on theaffirmative invariable concomitance, namely, 'Whatever is knowable isnameable'. Here negative invariable concomitance is not possible.

TheAdvaitins, like the Mimamsakas, do not acknowledge negative invariableconcomitance - kevala-vyatireki, because, according to them, knowledgeof negative invariable concomitance is not possible without theknowledge of affirmative invariable concomitance. The conclusionderived from negative invariable concomitance is treated asarthaapatti. Both anvaya-vyatireki and kevala-vyatireki are rejected bythem and only anvayi is accepted. This includes the type of inferencedesignated as kevala-anvayi by the Naiyayikas. But Advaitins repudiatethe latter term as too narrow.

In Vedanta, as in Nyaya, inference is twofold - that for oneself and that for others.

Inference for oneself:

Theinferential knowledge, "The hill has fire", arises when one hasknowledge of the reason (smoke) being present in the thing (hill) wheresomething (fire) is to be inferred, in the form, "This has smoke", andthere is awakening of the latent impression left by previousexperience, in the form, "Smoke is a subordinate concomitant of fire".The knowledge "The hill has fire" is inferential only in respect of thefire, and not in respect of the hill, because the knowledge of the hillis a perception.

Inference for others:

This requires the help of syllogisms. The component parts of a syllogism have already been given above.

The three levels of reality

Accordingto Advaita Vedanta there are three levels of reality- absolute(paaramaarthika), empirical (vyaavahaarika) and illusory(praatibhaasika). Brahman alone is absolute reality. Everything in theuniverse has only empirical reality, i.e. they are real only till thedawn of Self-knowledge. Things such the illusory snake appearing onrope, silver on shell, objects experienced in dream, have only illusoryreality.

The unreality of the universe is inferred from the statements in the srutis that there is nothing other than Brahman.

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